1 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. The second type of unconstitutional practice is that which "affects the political strength of various groups," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. UJO, 430 U. S., at 162165 (opinion of WHITE, J. The First District was somewhat hook-shaped, beginning in the northeastern part of the state and tapering down with fingerlike extensions almost to the South Carolina border. The Attorney General specifically objected to the configuration of boundary lines drawn in the south-central to southeastern region of the State. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). income. 3. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Cf. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. 21-24 (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing "grotesque gerrymandering" and "unusual shapes" drawn solely to deprive Democratic voters of electoral power). Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts 2. of Oral Arg. 1237, 1258 (1993). It therefore warrants different analysis. Const., Amdt. against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. It also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees, finding, among other things, that, under United Jewish Organizations of Williams burgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (UJO), appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim because favoring minority voters was not discriminatory in the constitutional sense and the plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters statewide. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. Allen v. State Bd. (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court's vote-dilution cases and thus warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of atlarge and multimember gerrymandering schemes. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need not detain us further. The first question is easy. Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? Centered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). ); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opinion of SOUTER, J. 1 "Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeatedly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a fact of life. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. A special three-judge district court dismissed the suit against both the attorney general and the state officials. The plan amounts to unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race 3.District 12 is not compact or contiguous which are criteria for district maps 4. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have made clear, however, that equal protection analysis "is not dependent. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. The central explanation has to do with the nature of the redistricting process. Cf. As for this latter category, we. Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. See supra, at 647-649. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorizationNorth Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional reapportionment plan with one majority-black district. The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. 364 U. S., at 341. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. The dissenters thought the unusual. Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. 6-10 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? We said as much in Gaffney: "[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State." 808 F. The facts of this case mirror those presented inUnited Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey(1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as aper sematter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. 8The black plaintiffs in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), I am confident, would have suffered equally had whites in Tuskegee sought to maintain their control by annexing predominantly white suburbs, rather than splitting the municipality in two. [Appendix containing map of North Carolina Congressional Plan follows this page.]. Supp., at 472. Supp., at 472-473. UJO, supra, at 148. In addition, nothing in the Court's decisions compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny; in fact, this country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting and the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). 649-652. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" See post, at 679 (opinion of STEVENS, J. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. We noted probable jurisdiction. Redistricting advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. "[L]ike bloc-voting by race, [the racial composition of geographic area] too is a fact of life, well known to those responsible for drawing electoral district lines. See ante, at 649. Under the three-part test established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 50-51 (1986), a minority group must show that it could constitute the majority in a single-member district, "that it is politically cohesive," and "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled, see id., at 165-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ. Why was Shaw v Reno an important decision in terms of minority representation? The company raises all equity from outside financing. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that the second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309-313 (1966). Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. 376 U. S., at 66-67. 808 F. 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). to Brief for Federal Appellees lOa. But numerous North Carolinians did. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. Id., at 139. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). by Wayne R. Arden and Jeffrey M. Wice; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law et al. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. post, at 684-685 (dissenting opinion). He read JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion in UJO to authorize race-based reapportionment only when the State employs traditional districting principles such as compactness and contiguity. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S., at 157-158; Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S., at 40. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. 12(b)(6). Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. You can explore additional available newsletters here. United States Supreme Court. Did the North Carolina residents who objected to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment? Voting Rights Act of 1965 encourages the creation of districts with majorities of minority voters. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. Draper uses the allowance method for receivables, estimating uncollectibles to be 5% of January credit sales. Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. The essence of the majority's argument is that UJO dealt with a claim of vote dilution-which required a specific showing of harm-and that cases such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), dealt with claims of racial segregation-which did not. the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." See App. The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, appellants instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . Id., at 179 (opinion concurring in judgment) (some citations omitted). the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Another of the weapons in the States' arsenal was the racial gerrymander-"the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries for [racial] purposes." There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity, and the Court's opinion (despite its many references to the shape of District 12, see ante, at 635-636, 641, 642, 644-648) does not suggest otherwise. Cf. Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? 1973. or benefit provided to others.4 All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. See, e. g., ante, at 639-641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. We previously have recognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. Cf. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Democratic National Committee et al. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. They did not even claim to be white. Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. Id., at 56-58. Nor was it ever in doubt that "the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner." 808 F. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 2 It should be noted that 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. Post, at 680 (dissenting opinion). As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). Instead, the Court creates a new "analytically distinct," ibid., cause of action, the principal element of which is that a districting plan be "so bizarre on its face," ante, at 644, or "irrational on its face," ante, at 652, or "extremely irregular on its face," ante, at 642, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification," ante, at 652. Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Dissenting Opinion. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. See 808 F. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. In my view there is no justification for the Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. 653-657. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." It also sends to elected representatives the message that their primary obligation is to represent only that group's members, rather than their constituency as a whole. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See App. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when they enter the next county. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. The Court found that race could not be the deciding factor when drawing districts. Ante, at 652. UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution. 657-658. It spite of such criticisms, the redistricting accomplished its goal. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. Journalize the entry to record the identification of the customers bad debt. The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. 8While the Court "express[es] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim," ante, at 649 (quoting ante, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting)), it repeatedly emphasizes that there is some reason to believe that a configuration devised with reference to traditional districting principles would present a case falling outside the cause of action recognized today. Hence, I see no need. Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. The Court applied the same reasoning to the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided" municipal boundary line at issue in Gomillion. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). We also do not decide. In Gingles the Court considered a multimember redistricting plan for the North Carolina State Legislature. Since the holding here makes it unnecessary to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged, the Court expresses no view on whether the intentional creation of majorityminority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). 3. Laws, ch. At what time (or times) during the 24-hour period does the maximum body temperature occur? This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". You're all set! Cf. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. Supp., at 466-467; id., at 474 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. isabela grutman religion, matt spaeth career earnings, police incident bracken ridge today, Faces more scrutiny than an advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority,! 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